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Abstract: A number of recent studies have identified an “overconfidence effect” 
in psychosis, whereby people with schizophrenia are overconfident in errors while 
simultaneously slightly underconfident when accurate. This effect may have impli-
cations for why delusions, which are based on inaccurate inferences, perceptions 
and judgements, are typically held with high conviction. Given the importance the 
overconfidence effect may have in accounting for delusional conviction, the cur-
rent narrative review aims to summarise and critique the recent evidence for the 
effect within schizophrenia. People with schizophrenia were consistently found to 
be overconfident in errors and slightly underconfident in correct appraisals, and this 
effect appears not to be an artefact of poor task performance. While the overconfi-
dence effect has been linked to delusion-proneness in the general population, there 
was less direct evidence linking overconfidence to delusional symptoms in clinical 
populations. Future studies need to adopt longitudinal designs and include addition-
al measures of overconfidence to investigate this association more appropriately, 
and to also investigate possible mediators of this postulated relationship, such as 
dopaminergic activity.
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1. Introduction
Overconfidence is broadly defined as when one’s confidence in subjective judgements, inferences, or 
predictions is reliably greater than the objective accuracy should allow. It has been studied exten-
sively within the general population (for a review see Hoffrage, 2004), which has also identified a 
number of conceptually similar effects. These include the “better-than-average” effect where, de-
spite mathematical odds, the majority of people evaluate their skills and abilities as above average 
(Matlin, 2004) and the Dunning–Kruger effect, where overconfidence is at its most severe for those 
who are incompetent in the skills and abilities in question (Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 
2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 2002). While it has been suggested that overconfidence can some-
times lead to positive effects, for example, boosted self-esteem (Hoffrage, 2004), heightened 
overconfidence has also been linked to a number of undesirable outcomes including problem gam-
bling (Goodie, 2005), inaccurate eyewitness testimonies (Brewer, 2006; Brewer & Wells, 2006), and 
even catastrophic accidents, such as the failed Challenger Space Shuttle launch (Plous, 1993).
More recently, the overconfidence effect has been examined in clinical populations, such as in 
people with psychotic disorders, particularly schizophrenia. Of note, it has been proposed that the 
bias may possibly account for the symptoms of schizophrenia, such as delusions, and specifically 
how such beliefs are maintained with such high conviction despite the presence of counter-evi-
dence. This review will examine the evidence suggesting that overconfidence is heightened in schiz-
ophrenia, before addressing the issue of whether the bias can adequately account for delusional 
conviction.
2. Overconfidence in schizophrenia
2.1. Jumping to conclusions bias
Some of the earliest evidence for heightened confidence in schizophrenia comes from the “jumping 
to conclusions” (JTC) bias literature, which suggests that people with schizophrenia accept partial or 
limited evidence as sufficient for making hasty, yet confident, decisions (Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & 
Gold, 2007). The bias is usually elicited using probabilistic reasoning tasks, such the “beads task”. 
During this task, participants are presented with two containers each filled with coloured beads (e.g. 
80:20 red to green and vice versa), and are asked to decide on the basis of an emerging bead se-
quence, which container beads are being drawn from. The typical finding is that people with schizo-
phrenia reach a decision, and have a lower confidence threshold, on the basis of less evidence (e.g. 
making a definite decision after only one bead) than healthy controls (e.g. Garety & Freeman, 2013; 
Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991).
While the JTC bias is a robust effect and has been replicated multiple times, a number of studies 
also suggest that the beads task may be confounded by high levels of miscomprehension among 
clinical samples, which could limit the validity of the bias (Balzan, Delfabbro, Galletly, & Woodward, 
2012; Moritz & Woodward, 2005). Moreover, it should be noted that JTC is, at best, only an indirect 
way of assessing overconfidence (e.g. hasty decision-making can still occur under low confidence). 
In fact, it has been suggested that heightened JTC among people with schizophrenia is a relative, not 
an absolute, effect, given that even highly delusional people are often still observed to respond con-
servatively on such tasks according to the optimal Bayes solution (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988; van 
der Leer & McKay, 2013). This questions whether the JTC effect actually represents objective 
overconfidence.
2.2. Beck cognitive insight scale (BCIS)
More direct evidence for overconfidence in schizophrenia comes from the Beck Cognitive Insight 
Scale (BCIS). Distinct from the construct of “clinical insight”, which is one’s awareness of their mental 
illness, “cognitive insight” is the ability of people with schizophrenia to identify and correct their 
distorted beliefs and misinterpretations (Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, & Warman, 2004). The scale 
consists of two factors: (i) self-reflectiveness, which assesses how much the individual believes that 
they may be wrong at times and their willingness to admit this; and (ii) self-certainty, which assesses 
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how much the individual believes that they are definitely correct about their decisions and experi-
ences (Beck et al., 2004; Warman & Martin, 2006). Lower self-reflectiveness and higher self-certainty 
scores therefore reflect a greater propensity to overconfidence. There is a growing body of literature 
which demonstrates that people with schizophrenia, and particularly those experiencing delusions, 
have lower cognitive insight than healthy controls, as evidenced by significantly lower levels of self-
reflectivity and significantly inflated levels of self-certainty (Bora, Erkan, Kayahan, & Veznedaroglu, 
2007; Bruno, Sachs, Demily, Franck, & Pacherie, 2012; Engh et al., 2010; Guerrero & Lysaker, 2013; 
Lysaker et al., 2011; Martin, Warman, & Lysaker, 2010).
However, not all the evidence regarding the BCIS is consistent; a number of studies have failed to 
show the same pattern of results regarding the direction of the subscales between clinical and non-
clinical groups. Contrary to expectations, some studies have reported significantly higher levels of 
self-reflectiveness among people with schizophrenia compared to non-delusional healthy controls 
(e.g. Kimhy et al., 2014), while others have failed to find a significant difference between these 
groups on the self-certainty scale (Engh et al., 2007; Kao & Liu, 2010). One recent study even dem-
onstrated that self-certainty was actually lower for people with schizophrenia (Köther et al., 2012). 
While low subjective confidence ratings on their own do not preclude the possibility of overconfi-
dence (i.e. low subjective confidence ratings could still be greater than objective accuracy), these 
mixed findings suggest that “self-certainty” is not always inflated in schizophrenia.
2.3. The metamemory studies
While the JTC and BCIS studies provide mixed evidence for a generalised overconfidence effect in 
schizophrenia, the most direct and extensive evidence has come from a series of experimental met-
amemory studies commencing in the early 2000s. These metacognitive studies were designed to 
gauge subjective memory functioning and confidence in people with schizophrenia (hence “meta-
memory”), and have employed two forms of task: source-monitoring tasks (Gawęda, Moritz, & 
Kokoszka, 2012; Moritz & Woodward, 2002, 2006a; Moritz, Woodward, & Chen, 2006; Moritz, 
Woodward, & Ruff, 2003; Moritz, Woodward, Whitman, & Cuttler, 2005), and tasks specifically de-
signed to elicit false memories (Bhatt, Laws, & McKenna, 2010; Moritz, Woodward, Cuttler, Whitman, 
& Watson, 2004; Moritz, Woodward, Jelinek, & Klinge, 2008; Moritz, Woodward, & Rodriguez-Raecke, 
2006; Peters et al., 2007).
In the former, participants are first presented with a list of words and asked to provide semantic 
associations for each word. Participants are subsequently presented with another list containing (a) 
their self-generated words; (b) the former experimenter-generated words; (c) and new words that 
were either related but not identical to the original stimulus list or had no associative relation to this 
list. For each of these words, participants are required to identify them as old or new, name the 
source (experimenter- or self-generated), and provide their degree of confidence for the source 
attribution.
The “false memory” tasks were designed to distinguish false-negative errors (i.e. previously pre-
sented information misjudged as new) from false-positive errors (i.e. new information misjudged as 
previously presented), and have usually employed the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. 
This paradigm usually presents participants with word lists that converge on one word, the “critical 
lure”, which is not contained in the study list (e.g. study list: hill, climb, valley, summit, top, molehill, 
peak, glacier, climber, range; critical lure: mountain). When presented with the critical lure during 
the test list, the common effect is that people will tend to falsely recall or recognise the lure (Moritz 
et al., 2004). The effect has also been elicited using visual stimuli via illustrated scenes or standard-
ised videos; for example, a typical populated beach, but with various critical lures missing, such as 
towels, rubber boats, beach umbrella (Moritz, Woodward, & Rodriguez-Raecke, 2006; Peters, 
Hauschildt, Moritz, & Jelinek, 2013).
Consistent with the expansive literature observing heightened memory deficits in schizophrenia 
(for a recent meta-analysis see Fioravanti, Bianchi, & Cinti, 2012), the majority of these metamemory 
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studies demonstrate that people with schizophrenia produce more memory errors than healthy con-
trols. However, by incorporating measures of memory confidence, the metamemory studies have 
revealed a heightened “overconfidence effect” among people with schizophrenia. Relative to healthy 
and non-schizophrenia psychiatric controls, patients with schizophrenia were found to be signifi-
cantly overconfident in memory errors and slightly underconfident given correct responses (Bhatt 
et al., 2010; Gawęda et al., 2012; Moritz & Woodward, 2002, 2006a; Moritz et al., 2004, 2005, 2008; 
Moritz, Woodward, & Chen, 2006; Moritz, Woodward, & Rodriguez-Raecke, 2006; Peters et al., 2013). 
These studies suggest that patients with schizophrenia have a reduced confidence gap, where the 
difference between confidence in errors and confidence in correct responses is significantly reduced. 
By contrast, healthy and psychiatric controls typically exhibit a higher confidence in correct respons-
es and lower confidence in errors (relative to people with schizophrenia), which leads to a larger 
confidence gap. The literature suggests that the overconfidence effect is also quantified by another 
parameter known as the knowledge corruption index. The index is computed as the number of errors 
held with high confidence over the total number of responses held with high confidence. As shown 
in Table 1, the metamemory studies have robustly shown a higher level of knowledge corruption 
among the patients with schizophrenia relative to controls, with consistently moderate to large ef-
fect sizes, regardless of methodological variations between studies. It is worth noting that a 
Table 1. Knowledge corruption across overconfidence studies
1Knowledge corruption is the proportion of high-confidence errors on all high-confidence responses.
2Delusion-proneness determined by Peters et al. Delusions Inventory within healthy controls.
3Paranoia determined by the Paranoia Checklist within healthy controls; non-metamemory task.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.
Studies Knowledge corruption (%)1 Effect size (d)
Schizophrenia Healthy controls 
(HC)
Moritz and Woodward (2002) 11.8* 4.9 0.72
Moritz et al. (2004) 33.7** 21.2 1.01
Moritz et al. (2005) 20.9** 8.6 0.77
Moritz and Woodward (2006a) 21.9*** 12.6 0.87
Moritz, Woodward, and Chen 
(2006)
20.9*** 9.4 1.45
Moritz, Woodward, and Rodri-
guez-Raecke (2006)
24.2** 18.3 0.71
Moritz et al. (2008) 23.4*** 6.2 0.92
Gawęda et al. (2012) 40.7*** 22.7 1.24
Peters et al. (2013) 17.8** 8.4 1.27
Moritz, Ramdani, et al. (2014) 17.2*** 6.5 0.86
Bhatt et al. (2010) Experiencing delu-
sions (ED)
Not experiencing 
delusions (ND)
ED vs. HC ND vs. HC
Total knowledge corruption 46.2** 45.5** 28.9 1.37 1.03
False-positive knowledge cor-
ruption 
57.2 47.9 43.6 0.72 0.20
False-negative knowledge cor-
ruption
18.0** 12.0 5.2 1.22 0.68
High-delusion-proneness/paranoia Low -delusion-prone-
ness/paranoia
Laws and Bhatt (2005)2 46*** 27 1.20
Moritz, Göritz, et al. (2014)3 20.1*** 11.9 0.63
Moritz et al. (2015)3 11.23*** 3.76 0.52
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heightened overconfidence bias has been observed in patients with first episode psychosis and 
those with at-risk mental state (Eisenacher et al., 2015), but also in healthy non-clinical individuals 
who score highly on measures of “delusion-proneness” (Laws & Bhatt, 2005; Warman, 2008) or 
paranoia (Moritz, Göritz, et al., 2014), suggesting the effect may be particularly relevant to the delu-
sional symptoms often observed in schizophrenia (again, with moderate to large effect sizes).
While acknowledging the apparent consistency of the effect across studies, it should also be not-
ed that one recent study demonstrated that the heightened overconfidence effect typically ob-
served in people with schizophrenia (or those identified as “delusion-prone”) may only occur when 
people feel competent in the given task, or find the task subjectively easy (Moritz et al., 2015). That 
is, group differences usually observed between schizophrenia and control groups, and high- and 
low-delusion-prone groups, may diminish when tasks are perceived to be difficult.
2.4. Overconfidence: An artefact of performance deficits?
Despite the evidence for a heightened overconfidence effect in schizophrenia, it is possible that the 
effect is confounded with the increased number of memory errors relative to healthy controls. That 
is, as people with schizophrenia make more errors, the potential frequency of making highly confi-
dent responses is increased. Moreover, a number of studies have shown that people with schizo-
phrenia are unaware of, or at least underestimate, the extent of their memory deficits (Balzan, 
Neaves, Denson, Liu, & Galletly, 2014; Bowie et al., 2007; Keefe, Poe, Walker, Kang, & Harvey, 2006; 
Köther et al., 2012; Moritz, Ferahli, & Naber, 2004; Poletti et al., 2012). It would therefore seem plau-
sible that people with schizophrenia may be overly confident in their impaired abilities simply be-
cause they are not aware that they are impaired in these domains, and inadvertently anchor their 
confidence ratings as if they are performing as well as healthy controls. This would also appear 
consistent with the Dunning–Kruger effect, which predicts that overconfidence is at its most ex-
treme for those who are incompetent in the skills and abilities in question (Dunning et al., 2003; 
Kruger & Dunning, 1999, 2002).
However, not all of the metamemory studies have reported memory deficits among participants 
with schizophrenia. For example, Moritz and Woodward (2006a) reported no difference in the rate of 
false-negative errors between people with schizophrenia and psychiatric controls; yet the schizo-
phrenia sample still demonstrated a significantly higher overconfidence in errors relative to the psy-
chiatric controls. Similarly, a number of the metamemory studies observing false-positive errors 
have not found significant differences between the schizophrenia and healthy control groups on 
objective performance; yet they showed significant differences between these groups on overconfi-
dence measures (Moritz et al., 2004; Moritz, Woodward, & Rodriguez-Raecke, 2006; Peters et al., 
2007, 2013). Furthermore, the emerging evidence that overconfidence in errors in people with psy-
chosis is particularly heightened when tasks are subjectively easy (Moritz et al., 2015), where objec-
tive error rates are likely to be diminished relative to more difficult tasks, suggests the effect is not 
merely a consequence of excessive memory errors.
Finally, the overconfidence effect has recently been replicated beyond the domain of memory er-
rors, where this potential confound of memory performance deficits can effectively be ruled out. 
Using tasks designed to measure errors in social cognitive processes (e.g. assessing the intentions of 
others or the ability to identify emotions from facial expressions or prosody), Köther et al. (2012) and 
Moritz, Woznica, Andreou, and Köther (2012) demonstrated that people with schizophrenia were 
overconfident in errors relative to healthy controls. More recently, Moritz, Ramdani, et al. (2014) in-
vestigated the overconfidence effect using a visual perception task, where participants were shown 
a series of blurry pictures, half of which contained a “hidden object”, while the others depicted ran-
dom noise. For each picture, participants were asked to determine if an object was being depicted or 
not, and to indicate their level of confidence in their response choice. Participants with schizophrenia 
demonstrated significantly greater confidence in errors and inflated knowledge corruption, but no 
difference in accuracy, relative to non-clinical controls and participants with obsessive–compulsive 
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disorder. These results were replicated in non-clinical participants who had scored highly on core 
paranoid symptoms (Moritz, Göritz, et al., 2014).
Taken together, while poor memory task performance might be a contributing factor for a height-
ened overconfidence effect in people with schizophrenia, or those at increased risk of developing 
psychosis, it does not appear to be the main driver of the bias. In fact, the effect may even diminish 
for difficult tasks where performance is lower, and it has been demonstrated in tasks that do not 
assess memory errors.
3. Overconfidence and delusions
3.1. The basis of delusional conviction?
Having established an evidence base for a heightened overconfidence effect within schizophrenia, 
Moritz and Woodward (e.g. 2006b) have suggested that the bias may play a role in the development 
and maintenance of the symptoms of schizophrenia, particularly delusions. Delusions are one of the 
defining characteristics of schizophrenia, and often lead to a disturbance in the construction of real-
ity. Delusions are defined as fixed false beliefs that (i) are maintained despite counter-evidence and 
rational counter-argument; (ii) would be dismissed by members of the same social-cultural environ-
ment; and (iii) are held with great conviction (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Hence, from 
the outset, the overconfidence effect would appear to be consistent with the very definition of a 
delusional belief; that is, high confidence and strong conviction in an erroneous belief.
More specifically, a simultaneous overconfidence in errors and underconfidence when correct may 
play a crucial role in raising the level of conviction necessary to form and maintain a delusional be-
lief. This is particularly important, for despite recent advancements in our understanding of the cog-
nitive biases and errors responsible for the formation and maintenance of delusions (for reviews see 
Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Freeman, 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999), the specific processes respon-
sible for the high conviction associated with delusional beliefs are less clearly understood. Indeed, 
cognitive errors such as false-positive memories, where fact and fiction may be confused, could be 
important in accounting for how specific delusional themes may arise (e.g. a persecutory delusion 
may be partially based on the false memory that one’s neighbours continually watch them). 
However, false memories are not unique to a diagnosis of schizophrenia (e.g. Elvevåg, Fisher, 
Weickert, Weinberger, & Goldberg, 2004; Lee, Iao, & Lin, 2006), so cannot be entirely responsible for 
the emergence of delusional beliefs, or why they are held with such high conviction.
Accordingly, Moritz and colleagues argue that it is not necessarily the inaccurate memories, cogni-
tive decisions, perceptions or judgements that lead to the strong conviction characteristic of delu-
sional beliefs; rather, it is the overconfidence in these errors that is important. For example, if a 
person travelling on a bus casually perceives that a fellow passenger might be looking angrily at him, 
this is unlikely to have a strong cognitive or behavioural impact, even if the appraisal is inaccurate. 
However, if the same person attaches high confidence to the accuracy of their erroneous perception, 
this may trigger a strong conviction in a fixed false belief (e.g. “I am under surveillance and my life 
is in danger”), which can also lead to behavioural consequences and emotional distress (Moritz et al., 
2012).
This is not to suggest that people without schizophrenia are immune to such errors. Rather it ap-
pears that people without schizophrenia are more likely to attach “not trustworthy” tags to cognitive 
errors, and therefore are more likely to dismiss erroneous memories, perceptions and judgements as 
trivial or implausible (Moritz & Woodward, 2006b). Even if people without schizophrenia were to hold 
onto particular beliefs substantiated by cognitive errors, it follows that these beliefs would typically 
be held with lower conviction than by people with schizophrenia. Greater social interaction and more 
established social networks among people without schizophrenia can also be helpful in slowing the 
progression of erroneous conclusions into erroneous fixed beliefs. Finally, the relative underconfi-
dence associated with accurate memories, decisions, perceptions and judgements in people with 
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schizophrenia may also reinforce conviction in delusional beliefs, as such appraisals would otherwise 
help to buffer against the formation of erroneous conclusions (e.g. “my neighbour works fulltime so 
could not possibly be watching me”).
3.2. Delusional ideation or diagnosis of schizophrenia?
Despite the explanatory potential for the overconfidence effect in accounting for the strong convic-
tion in delusional beliefs, one limitation in this interpretation is that relatively few studies thus far 
have actually linked the bias to delusional/paranoid symptoms in people with schizophrenia (i.e. 
Bhatt et al., 2010; Eisenacher et al., 2015; Moritz, Ramdani, et al., 2014). Although there is a consen-
sus that overconfidence is heightened in schizophrenia (Table 1), no additional study reviewed here 
has found a significant association between the effect and delusional severity in schizophrenia. 
Recent work even suggests that overconfidence in errors may be more closely linked to the neuro-
cognitive deficits observed in schizophrenia, rather than delusional ideation (Eifler et al., 2015). This 
is in contrast to other cognitive biases associated with schizophrenia, including the JTC bias and the 
“bias against disconfirmatory evidence” (BADE), which have both been found to correlate signifi-
cantly with delusional severity (Sanford, Lecomte, Leclerc, Wykes, & Woodward, 2013; So, Garety, 
Peters, & Kapur, 2010; Speechley, Moritz, Ngan, & Woodward, 2012). This suggests that while other 
cognitive biases may play a role in the development and maintenance of delusions, overconfidence 
may be better viewed as a consequence of the disorder itself rather than a mediator of delusional 
conviction.
However, despite the limited evidence of a direct association between overconfidence and delu-
sional ideation in schizophrenia, it would be premature to conclude that overconfidence is not linked 
to the formation or maintenance of delusional conviction. Importantly, while only three studies have 
reported statistically significant associations in overconfidence between delusional states (Bhatt et 
al., 2010), paranoia (Moritz, Ramdani, et al., 2014), or delusional conviction (Eisenacher et al., 2015), 
the effect sizes were moderate to large (d = .43, 68, 1.10, respectively), and are also comparable to 
those which reported heightened overconfidence among healthy non-clinical individuals who scored 
highly on measures of “delusion-proneness” (Laws & Bhatt, 2005; d = 1.20) or delusional paranoia 
(Moritz et al., 2015; d =.52; Moritz, Göritz, et al., 2014; d =.63). This not only suggests that there may 
be a predisposition to the overconfidence bias that is distinct from the onset of schizophrenia, but 
that the bias is consistent across samples of varying levels of delusional propensity. Moreover, there 
is also evidence that the overconfidence effect can be attenuated under the influence of dopamin-
ergic agonists (Andreou, Moritz, Veith, Veckenstedt, & Naber, 2014; Moritz et al., 2003, 2008), which 
suggests that the effect, like delusions, may be modulated by dopaminergic activity. Whether this 
finding coincides with a simultaneous reduction in delusional severity is yet to be determined by 
future research, but it reiterates the possible association between overconfidence and delusional 
ideation.
There are also a number of methodological issues in the overconfidence in errors literature that 
may have contributed to the lack of association between the bias and delusional ideation. First, all 
of the studies observing the overconfidence effect in schizophrenia have been cross sectional in 
design, rather than monitoring whether longitudinal changes in delusional severity are linked to the 
overconfidence effect. One of the issues with cross-sectional studies in this context is that the be-
tween-group comparisons (e.g. delusional vs. non-delusional) are not as sensitive or powerful as 
within-group comparisons, which reduce sources of error that could be influencing results, as each 
participant serves as their own control (Woodward, Munz, LeClerc, & Lecomte, 2009). Furthermore, 
cross-sectional studies do not control for pre-existing differences between delusional and non-delu-
sional groups, which would remain stable independent of delusional status, and that could other-
wise account for apparent similarities in overconfidence between these groups (e.g. genetic or 
environmental predisposition that affects a cognitive style prompting overconfidence). Again, longi-
tudinal studies are more powerful and interpretable as these potential pre-existing differences be-
tween delusional and non-delusional conditions are held constant as delusional severity changes 
(Woodward et al., 2009). To better understand the overconfidence effect between delusional states, 
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future replications could adopt a longitudinal design. Such longitudinal designs could also employ 
particularly easy tasks, as this appears to heighten the overconfidence effect in schizophrenia and 
delusion-prone groups (Moritz et al., 2015), which may therefore also help distinguish delusional 
from non-delusional groups.
It is also apparent that the majority of the overconfidence studies reviewed here (even those that 
have recently gone beyond using metamemory tasks), have all been conducted by the same re-
search team (Table 1), which calls into question the generalisability of the findings, and the need for 
independent replication. Moreover, most of these studies have typically employed the same two 
measures of overconfidence: the confidence gap and knowledge corruption. While these measures 
are able to adequately distinguish clinical from non-clinical groups (Table 1), they may not be as 
sensitive at detecting more subtle differences between delusional and/or “delusion-proneness” 
states. This may stem from the descriptive, often dichotomous, measures these studies employ to 
assess confidence; for example, in the DRM false-memory tasks, participants typically only have the 
option of selecting “high” or “low” confidence for any given response. While such responses are good 
at capturing the nature of a person’s confidence, the relative lack of specificity might make it difficult 
to detect the potentially subtle cognitive differences between high and low delusional states in clini-
cal samples. This descriptive approach may also lead to ambiguity regarding what actually consti-
tutes “overconfidence”. For example, if a participant indicated “low confidence” for an incorrect 
answer, this could still technically represent overconfidence, as subjective confidence (e.g. 20%) 
might actually be greater than objective accuracy (i.e. 0%). Without the option of accurately calibrat-
ing overall confidence and objective accuracy, differences in “overconfidence in errors” between 
high- and low-delusional groups may technically be present but not be detectable (e.g. both groups 
might indicate a similar proportion of “high-confidence” errors, yet might differ on the specific mis-
calibration between overall confidence and accuracy). The “confidence gap” and “knowledge cor-
ruption” metrics may further be underestimating overconfidence, as they are typically based only on 
high-confidence errors, and do not account for any “low-confidence” errors, which might actually 
represent objective “overconfidence”.
While these issues do not call into question the robustness of the overconfidence effect within 
schizophrenia, they do suggest the direction future research in the area could take. At the very least, 
independent replication of the overconfidence effect is warranted to ensure greater generalisability. 
Non-descriptive measures of confidence could also be utilised in addition to current measures, 
which may improve the specificity of the overconfidence effect within clinical samples. The majority 
of studies observing overconfidence in the general non-clinical population have either used proba-
bility estimates of the correctness of general knowledge questions (e.g. “which city is located further 
north: Rome or New York?”), or estimates of confidence ranges (e.g. “provide a low and high guess 
for the length of the Amazon river such that you are 80% sure the correct answer falls between the 
two”) (Hoffrage, 2004). In the former, overconfidence refers to a miscalibration between subjective 
confidence and objective accuracy; for the latter, overconfidence is a confidence–accuracy miscali-
bration characterised by subjective confidence ranges that are too narrow for the observed level of 
accuracy (i.e. providing a range that does not include the correct answer). Using such measures 
would bring our understanding of overconfidence in schizophrenia in line with majority of studies 
that have examined the effect in the general population, but they might also represent a more sensi-
tive approach in assessing overconfidence (i.e. use of calibration curves; specific confidence ranges 
vs. self-reported confidence levels), that may be able to better distinguish between delusional and 
non-delusional subsamples. Interestingly, while the overconfidence in errors effect seems to dimin-
ish when tasks are subjectively more difficult (Moritz et al., 2015), the miscalibration literature sug-
gests that overconfidence is actually heightened by task difficulty (Hoffrage, 2004). Therefore, on the 
one hand, using objectively easier tasks that encourage participants to feel competent could elevate 
overconfidence in errors sufficiently to distinguish between delusional and non-delusional groups; 
yet using more difficult tasks may achieve the same outcome. Future research would need to inves-
tigate this apparent paradox.
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4. Conclusions
The present paper has provided an overview of the overconfidence effect within schizophrenia, char-
acterised by overconfidence in errors and slight underconfidence when correct. Despite gaps in the 
current literature linking the effect to delusional severity, this bias may offer an important theoreti-
cal account for how inaccurate decisions, perceptions or judgements can lead to the formation and 
maintenance of fixed false beliefs that are held with high conviction. To validate these theoretical 
assumptions, future studies on the overconfidence effect in schizophrenia need to adopt longitudi-
nal designs and include additional measures of overconfidence that will determine if the effect is 
related to delusional severity, or if it is a consequence of the disorder itself. Only then can we be 
confident that overconfidence is the foundation of delusional conviction.
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